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This  paper  investigates  nominal  interest  and  inflation  behavior  in the  EMS  between  March  1979 
and September  1989 using a modified  version  of principal  components  analysis.  Neither  oter  :he 
whole  period,  nor  after  March  1983  has  the  EMS  functioned  as  a  Dmark-zone:  deviating 
movements  in inllation  and interest  rates  between  EMS  countries  still persist.  Most  important  is 
the division  between  Germany,  the  Netherlands  and  the  Ucited  Kingdom  on  the  one  hand,  and 
Belgium,  France  and  It+  on  the  other.  Differences  in  deflationary  po!lc:ies ‘;etween  countries 
inside and  outside  the  EMS appear  to  be the most  important  detenainanb  . J’ .’ I s result. 
In  recent  years  it has  become  well  established  that  tl!c  European  Monetary 
System  (EMS)  has  been  successful  in  limiting  exchange  rate  volatility.  There 
is little  consensus,  though,  on  how  the  system  has  functioned  in  practice.  In 
this  study  we  assess  the  timing  and  speed  of  monetary  convergence  between 
EMS  countries  over  the  period  from  March  1979  to  September  1989  by 
studying  nominal  interest  and  inflation  behavior.  Our  approach  differs  from 
most  of  the  existing  literature  in  two  respects.  First,  we  focus  on  bilateral 
interest  and  inflation  rate  differentials  between  each  pair  of  countries,  as 
opposed  to  most  other  work  in  which  Germany  functions  as  the  sole 
benchmark  country.’  Second,  instead  of  the  generally  used  VAR-regressions 
we apply  a modified  verison  of the  principal  components  analysis. 
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‘De Grauwe  (1989). Artls and  Taylor  (1988), Fratianni  and  von  Hagen  (1990a, bj, van  Hagen 
and  Fratianni  (1990) and Cohen  and  Wyplosz  (I 989) are examples  of studies in which  symmetric 
interest  differentials  are  used too. 
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The  first  i~p~~~a~t  issue  we  address  is  whether  the  E  S  is  a  de  facto 
mark-zone,  that  is,  whether  Germany  ~taila~era~ly decide 
S countries  passively  fQ~~Qwi~g 
converge,  and  so  would  i 
assumption  of  integrated  financial  markets.  Alternatively,  countries  unable  or 
unwilling  to  follow  such  accommodating  policies  may  infrequenliy  change 
their  exchange  rate  and  impose  capital  controls  to  gain  limited  independence, 
resulting  in  considerable  movements  in  interest  rate  differentials  and 
exchange  rates. 
The  existing  empirical  evidence  is  ambiguous  on  this  point.  Giavazzi  and 
Giovannini  (1988),  for  example,  argue  that  the  EMS  is  a  Dmark-zone, 
whereas  De  Grauwe  (1989),  Fratianni  and  von  Hagen  (1990a)  and  von 
agen  and  Fratianni  (1990)  conclude  that  there  may  be  some  room  left  for 
independent  monetary  policies  within  the  EMS. 
In  this  respect,  there  may  be  a  c.onsiderable  difference  in  the  functicning  of 
the  EMS  before  and  after  1983. While  five realignments  were necessary  in  the 
two-year  period  from  March  1981  to  March  1983,  only  four  realignments 
occurred  in  the  subsequent  six  years.  A  policy  turn-around  giving  more 
priority  to  the  requirements  of  EMS  membership  took  place  in  individual 
countries  at  different  times  in  the  early  eighties.’  We,  therefore,  compare  the 
full  sample  evidence  with  the  results  over  the  period  from  March  1983  to 
September  1989  to  provide  an  assessment  of  the  increased  degree  of 
convergence  within  the  EMS. 
Second,  we  analyze  the  existence  and  importance  of  implicit  restrictions 
imposed  by  EMS  membership  with  respect  to  the  deflationary  paths  followed 
in  various  countries  in  the  early  eighties.  For  this  purpose  we  explicitly 
compare  inflation  and  interest  rate  behavior  in  high  inflation  countries 
within  the  EMS,  such  as  Italy  and  France,  with  inflation  and  interest  rate 
movements  in  the  United  Kingdom,  which  supposedly  should  have  had  more 
freedom  in  determining  its  own  monetary  policy. 
In  our  empirical  work  we  investigate  whether  dominant  movements  in 
nominal  interest  and  inflation  differentials  may  be  attributed  to  specific 
countries  or  grou,ns  of  countries  using  a  principa.1  components  technique.3 
We focus  on  interest  and  inflation  differentials  as  opposed  to  levels  because  it 
is  differentials  that  are  of  central  importsnce  in  assessing  the  degree  and 
speed  of convergence  of monetary  policies  within  the  EMS. 
The  major  advantage  of the  chosen  principal  components  technique  is that 
it  allows  a  simultaneous  analysis  of  all  bilateral  interest  and  inflation 
differentials  within  the  EMS  as  a  system.  The  technique  effectively  extracts 
linear  combinations  from  a  multivariate  time  series  in  order  of  persistence 
‘See Sachs and Wyplosz  (1986) for  the  case  of  France,  Dornbusch  (1989)  for  Ireland,  and 
Giavani  and  Spaventa  ( 1989) for  Italy.  See also Giavazzi  and  Giovannini  (1988). 
3See Koedijk  and  :khotman  (1989) for  an application  of this technique  to exchange  rates. ark cQ~~try,  as  would  be  necessary  in  a 
principal  components  technique,  4  however,  to  make  the  set  of  extracted 
principal  components  unique  and  invariant  to  the  arbitrary  choice  of 
benchmark  country. 
We  restrict  our  analysis  to  the  E  elgium  (BE),  France  (FR), 
Germany  (WG),  Ireland  (IR),  Italy  (IT),  the  Netherlands  (NL),  and  the 
United  Kingdom  (UK)  between  March  1979 and  September  1989. Denmark 
is  left  out  of  the  analysis  as  no  representative  interest  rate  series  was 
available  to  us. Spain  only  entered  the  EMS  on  June  19, 1989. Both  its  short 
membership  and  the  lack  of  data  prevented  its  inclusion.  Although  the 
United  Kingdom  only  joined  the  exchange  rate  mechanism  (ERM)  of  the 
EMS  in  October  1990, we nevertheless  include  this  country  in  the  analysis  to 
be  able  to  investigate  whether  its  choice  not  to  participate  in  the  ERM 
before  October  1990  has  allowed  a  more  independent  monetary  policy  as 
reflected  in  diverging  inflation  and  interest  rates.  In  the  past,  significant 
interest  rate  links  have  been  documented  between  the  United  States  and 
Europe.’  Here,  however,  our  objective  is  to  characterize  and  analyze  intra- 
EMS  inflation  and  interest  rate  behavior,  not  to  study  the  linkages  between 
the  EMS  and  the  rest  of  the  world.  We,  therefore,  exclude  the  United  States 
from  the  analysis.  Consequently,  our  results  are  conditional  on  developments 
outside  of the  EMS.6 
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  section  2  we  briefly  discuss  the 
applied  methodology,  while  we  deal  with  the  data-construction  in  section  3. 
In  section  4  we  apply  the  analysis  to  interest  differentials  and  inflation 
differentials  between  the  EMS  countries.  We  discuss  the  results  and  evaluate 
their  implications.  The  sensitivity  of the  results  for  choice  of  sample  period  is 
investigated  by  comparing  the  results  for  the  full  sample  period  with  the 
41n  the  co-integration  literature  Stock  and  Watson  (1988)  demonstrate  how  principal 
component  analysis  is connected  to  tests  for  the  number  of  unit  roots  in  a  multivariate  time 
series and  the  estimation  of co-integrating  vectors.  Thee  links  enable  a further  interpretation  of 
the principal  components  analysis  and  of tests  of long-run  parity  conditions.  Unfortunately,  unit 
root  tests have  notorious  low power  in small samples. Since the  theoretical  discussion  on  testing 
for  long-run  equilibrium  relations  has  not  been  settled  yet,  we  consider  the  application  of 
multivariate  unit  root  tests to be outside  the  scope of the  present  paper. 
5See, for example,  Cumby  and  Mishkin  (1986). 
“In theory,  unwarranted  omission  of important  variables  like  U.S. inflation  and  interest  rates 
may  lead  to  a spurious  correlations  between  the  remaining  EMS  countries.  In  a related  working 
paper  [Koedijk  and  Kool(1990)],  however,  similar evidence  is provided  for  real  short-term  and 
long-term  interest  differentials  including  the  United  States.  The  major  conclusion  is that  within 
the  EMS  the  same  relations  are  found  a:  reported  in  this  paper,  even  though  U.S.  interest 
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results  for  the  sample  period  arch  1983  to  September  1989.  Sectio 
c0n.ain.s  our  conclusions. 
In  the  analysis  of  inflation  and  interest  rate  differentials  using  standard 
principal  components  analysis  the  arbitrary  choice  of  benchmark  currency 
affects  the  component  structure.  The  correlation  matrix  of  interest  differen- 
tials  vis-&vis  Germany  produces  a  different  set  of  principal  components  than 
a similar  correlation  matrix  calculated  vis&vis  France  or  Italy,  although  the 
information  content  is identical. 
To  overcome  this  problem  we  require  the  set  of  principal  components  to 
be  invariant  with  respect  to  the  choice  of  benchmark  country.  As  we  will 
show,  the  cross-country  restrictions  on  bilateral  interest  rate  differentials  (and 
inflation  differentials  for  that  matter)  provide  useful  prior  information  to 
obtain  such  invariance  property  in  a natural  and  intuitive  way. 
Consider  an  (n x 1) multivariate  time  series  (x,>T=  l  of interest  (or  inflation) 
differentials  vis-&is  a  common  benchmark  country.  Observations  on  (xt> 
are  stored  in  the  (TX n)  data  matrix  X.  The  (T x 91) matrix  Z  of  principal 
components  is a transformation  of the  data  matrix  X, such  that 
(i)  Z=XQB,  with  Q positive  definite  symmetric  and  B non-singular, 
(ii)  Z’Z = ,4, with  /1 a diagonal  matrix  with  elements  A1  z&  2  *. *  2 1,20, 
(i!i)  s’QZ3  = I, a normalization. 
Condition  (i)  expresses  the  linearity  of  the  transformation  X-+Z.  Q  is  a 
(n x n) scaling  matrix  and  B is a (n x n) matrix  containing  the  so-called  factor 
loadings.  The  second  condition  requires  the  components  to  be  orthogonal.  A 
is  a  (n x n)  diagonal  matrix.  The  elements  of  /1  are  the  variances  of  the 
principal  components  in  descending  order  of  magnitude.  The  first  principal 
components  (the  first  column  of  Z)  has  the  largest  variance.  Condition  (iii)  is 
a  normalization  to  set  the  scale  of  Z.  The  transformation  from  X  to  Z  is 
unique  once  Q  has  been  specified,  i.e.  there  exists  only  one  matrix  B 
satisfying  conditions  (i),  (ii)  and  (iii),’  see  Learner  (1978,  Appendix  A, 
Theorem  35).  B,  Z  and  n  may  be  computed  by  solving  the  eigenvalue 
problem 
where  Q1j2Q’12  -  -Q.  Equation  (1)  shows  how  the  components  depend  on  the 
choice  of  the  scaling  matrix  Q112. Q  is  not  determined  in  the  principal 
components  analysis,  but  must  be  specified  a priori  by  the  user. 
In  many  principal  components  application,  scale  dependence  problems 
.’ ‘B is unique  apart  from  sign, if all elements  of A are different,  which  we henceforth  assume. ation  ~i~e~entiai5  within  the  E  929 
that  the  diagonal  elements  of  Q 
sample  variance  of  (Xii>. 
The  issue  of scale  dependence  plays  no  role  in  our  analysis,  however  as  all 
variables  have  the  same  dimension.  Instead,  is chosen  such  as  to  make  the 
components  2  invariant  to  a change  in  the  benchmark  country. 
To  find  a  suitable  matrix  Q  we  first  look  at  the  effect  of  a  change  in  the 
benchmark  country.  Let  xkj be  the  nominal  interest  differential  of  country  j 
against  the  benchmark  country  k.  Letting  country  i  be  the  benchmark 
irrstead  of country  k amounts  to  the  linear  transformation: 
Xij=Xkj-Xki,  for  j#kk, 
Xik  =  -X&i. 
(2) 
The  transformation  can  be written  in  matrix  notation  as 
X1  =  px”, 
where  P  is the  (a x n) matrix: 
(3) 
in  which  I  is  a  unity  vector’  (here  of  length  n-1),  I  is  the  identity  matrix, 
x0  is  a  (n x 1)  vector  of  interest  differentials  relative  to  the  original 
benchmark  country,  and  x1  is  the  vector  of  interest  differentials  relative  to 
the  new  benchmark  country  (in  this  case  country  1).  For  notational 
convenience  we  have  rearranged  the  order  of  interest  rate  differentials  such 
that  currency  1  became  the  new  benchmark.  Transformation  to  another 
benchmark  country,  say  country  k,  entails  a  permutation  of  the  rows  and 
columns  of  P.  An  important  property  of  P  is  that  it  is  unipotent,  meaning 
that  P2 = 1.  Applying  the  same  transformation  twice  yields  the  original 
interest  differentials. 
Let  Xi  and  X,  be  the  (TX n)  matrices  of  observations  on  interest  rate 
differentials  with  respect  to  countries  i  and  k.  respectively.  A  change  of  the 
benchmark  implies  that  the  data  matrix  Xi  is  postmultiplied  by  B’ (after  the 
‘For  notational  convenience  the  subscripts  on  I  and  1 will be  suppressed  when  there  can  be 
no confusion  about  their  appropriate  dimensions. oedijk  and  C.J.M.  Kook  luterest  and  injlation  di@erentials  within  the  EMS 
ench  if 
xi 
Using  the  data  tra 
unipotent,  we can  write: 
XiQBi=Xk(P’QP)P 
(5) 
matrix  P  in  (  )  and  the  fact  that  P  is 
(6) 
Comparison  of  (5)  and  (6)  shows  that  the  principal  components  are 
invariant  to  the  change  in  the  benchmark  if  we  can  construct  Q  such  that 
Q.= P’QP,  and  if the  factor  loadings  are  related  by  Bk  = PBi.  Moreover,  these 
conditions  must  ho!d  for  a!l  possible  benchmark  countries,  i.e.  all  permu- 
tations  of  the  transformation  matrix  P.  Partitioning  Q-l  ami  expanding  the 
condition  Q = P’Q P  yields: 




=  q1 
q’ll-q21  ql  (7) 
where  ql’  is  a  scalar,  q1  ’  and  q2’  are  (n-l)  vectors  and  Q22  is  a 
((n-  1) x (n-  1)) matrix.  From  eq. (7) we obtain  the  restrictions 
21  4 
4  ;l  Z----l 
and 
12  4 
4  fl* 
=-  I’  (fW 
All  con-diagonal  elements  in  the  first  row  and  column  of Q-’  must  be the 
same  and  equal  to  half  the  first  diagonal  element.  Since  this  must  also  hold  if 
columns  and  rows  1 and  j  (j = 2,. . . , n)  are  interchanged,  the  restrictions  in 
for  all  columns  and  rows.  Hence  the  matrix  Q-l  has  the 
structure with”  a=(1  -(n-  1)~“2)/n.  e  verified  that  Bk =PBj  relates 
the  new  factor  loadings  to  the  old  factor  loadings.  To  prove  this  we  need 
condition  (ii)  in  the  definition  af  the  principal  components.  The  factor 
loadings  are  uniquely  determined  by  the  requirement  that  the  principal 
components  are  orthogonal  with  decreasing  variances  that  appear  on  the 
diagonal  of the  /i: 
=(B;P’Q”“j(Q1’*X;X,Q”2)(Q”2Z’Bi)  (11) 
But  B,  and  /i,  are  also  uniquely  determined  in 
/lk = B;QX;X,QB,  -(B~Q”Z)(Q1’2X;X,Q”‘2)(Q1’2Bk).  (12) 
Conditions  ( 11)  and  (12)  define  the  same  eigenvalue  problem,  since 
(Q”‘PBi)  and  Q1!?Bk  are  both  required  to  be  orthogonal  matrices  in 
condition  (iii)  of  the  definition  of  the  principal  components.  Therefore 
Bk  = PB;,  and  /i,  =ni.  This  completes  the  proof  that  the  proposed  choice  of 
Q  results  in  a  unique  set  cf  principal  components,  un.conditional  on  the 
benchmark  chosen. 
If  all  n  components  are  extracteci  from  the  original  series  the  transforma- 
tion  is  non-singular  and  no  informa.tion  in  the  data  is  lost.  The  amount  of 
variation  in  the  data  explained  b:,  the  first  K  principal  components  is 
expressed  by  the  goodness-of-fit  statistic  [see  Anderson  (1984)]: 
total  variance  of first K componertts  R,(K)  -z__-----____-  - 
total  variance  of transformed  data 
‘In  a maximum  likelihood  derivation  of the principal  componenis,  8 has  the  interpretation  of 
a variance.  The  choice  of 0 does  not  aFFect  the  far;tor  loadings;  it tiniy  serves  as a scalar  scaling 
parameter  for all time series of principal  compont:nts. 
“The  alternative  solution  is !x  =( 1 +(n+  l)-  “‘)/n.  Which  of  the  two  solutions  for  01  is chosen 
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where  I,  > A2  > . . . > ;I,, are  the  eigenvalues  o 
(T  x  K)  matrix  of  the  first  K  principal  corn 
1’2),  and 
he  trans 
For  the  interpretation  of  the  components  our  interest  is in  the  correlation 
between  component  i  and  a  time  series  of  interest  rate  or  inflation 
differentials  Xij.  Since  the  principal  components  are  orthogonal,  the  total 
amount  of  variation  in  xii explained  by  the  first  K  components  is  the  sum  of 
the  squared  correlations: 
R;(K)=  5  r?(I), 
I=1 
(14) 
where  r;(l)  is the  squared  correlation  between  Xij and  component  1. 
The  principal  components  analysis  is  largely  descriptive  and  only  allows 
for  identification  of  groups  of  countries  with  similar  interest  and  inflation 
rate  patterns.  Formal  testing  is as  yet  infeasible.  In  our  analysis,  we will  focus 
on  a comparison  of individual  correlations  r;(Z) with  the  overall  fit  measured 
by  Jt/~~= 1 Ai,  therefore.  We  concentrate  on  those  correlations  r;(Z) exceeding 
the  average  fit  A,&‘= 1 Ai,  which  are  printed  bold  in  the  tables.  If a  number  of 
interest  or  inflation  differentials  is highly  -  that  is, above  average  -  correlated 
with  some  principal  component,  we identify  this  component  with  that  group. 
3.  Data  construction 
The  principal  components  analysis  is  applied  to  Belgium  (BE),  France 
(FR),  Germany  (WG),  Ireland  (IR),  Italy  (IT),  the  Netherlands  (NL)  and  the 
United  Kingdom  (UK).  End-of-month  domestic  nominal  interest  rates  (T- 
and  4-month  representative  money  market  rates)  between  March  1979  and 
September  1989 are  obtained  from  several  issues  of  World  Financial  Markets 
(Morgan  Guaranty).  Inflation  is  measured  as  the  year  over  year  growth  of 
the  CPI,  which  is  taken  from  the  IFS  databank  (line  64)  for  all  countries. 
For  Ireland  only  quarterly  C  I  data  are  available.  We,  therefore,  use  the 
interpolated  CPI  series  for  Ireland  from  various  issues  of  European 
Economy. 
Section  4.1  below  presents  the  principal  components  results  for  the  whole 
sample  from  March  1979  t  September  1989.  In  section  4.2  we  show  the 
results  for  the  period  since  arch  1983, excludi  the  volatile  years  1979- 
realignments  in  S  have  been  scarce, 
ally  led  to  lower .6.  Koedijk  and  C.J.  Kool,  Interest  and injlation  933 
being  a  de  facto  Dmark-zone,  the 
possible  constraints  on  deflationary  policies  as  imposed  by  EMS  membership 
end  the  position  of  the  United  Kingdom  on  the  threshold  of  the  EMS  are 
covered  in  greater  detail  here. 
4.1.  March  1979  to September  1989 
The  results  of  the  principal  components  analysis  for  nominal  interest 
rate”  and  inflation  differentials  respectively  are  summarized  in  table  1. The 
upper  part  of  the  table  gives  some  overall  statistics  for  both  interest  and 
inflation  differentials:  the  variance  of  the  individual  principal  components 
and  their  respective  goodness-of-lit.  It  only  takes  two  principal  components 
to  explain  80%  and  90%  respectively  of  the  total  variance  of  interest  and 
inflation  differentials  within  the  EMS.” 
The  interpretation  of  the  principal  components  relies  on  the  correlations 
between  the  interest  or  inflation  differentials  and  the  corresponding  first  two 
principal  components.  Parts  A  to  G  in  table  1 report  the  squared  correla- 
tions  between  each  of  the  first  two  components  and  the  corresponding 
underlying  differentials  versus  each  of  the  benchmark  countries  in  turn.  The 
upper  right  triangle  of  the  table  contains  the  results  for  the  interest 
differentials,  while  the  correlations  in  the  lower  left  triangle  are  for  the 
inflation  differentials.  Individual  correlations  exceeding  the  average  lit  of  the 
principal  component  under  consideration  are  printed  in  bold  characters  and 
are  the  main  focus  of discussion. 
The  difference  in  interest  rate  behavior  between  the  United  Kingdom  - 
and  to  a  somewhat  lesser  extent  the  Netherlands  and  Germany  -  on  the  one 
hand  and  Belgium,  France  and  Italy  on  the  other  appears  the  most 
important  single  factor.  This  is  exemplified  in  the  first  row  of  the  column 
headed  UK  in  table  1  and  the  column  hea.ded  WG  in  part  F:  The 
correlations  between  the  first  principal  component  and  the  bilateral  interest 
rate  differentials  vis-a-vis  the  United  Kingdom.  are  very  high  for  Belgium, 
France  and  Italy  and  low  for  the  other  countries.  This  first  principal 
“We  did  the  same  analysis  using  3-month  Eurorates.  After  1983, results  closely  resemble 
those  of  domestic  interest  rates.  For  the  whole  sample,  French  and  Italian  interest  rate 
behaviour  dominates  the  principal  components  analysis  due  to  speculative  attacks  in  times  of 
expected  realignments.  As Ibis is not  the  issue  we are  interested  in, we only  present  the  results 
for the domestic  interest  rates. 
“To  examine  the  sensitivity  of  the  results  for  the  observed  realignments  in  the  full  sample 
period,  prEncipa1 components  have  also  been  computed  excluding  all  months  in  which  a 
iealignmei~t  occmred  and  iilc  morlihs  imrue&ately  preceding  and  following  the  realignments. 
The  results  were only  marginally  different  from  the ones  that  are  presented  in table  1. 934  K.G.  Kordijk  and  C.J.  Kool,  lnteresl  and  inflation  difirentials  within  the  E 
Table  1 
Principal  components  of  interest  differentials  (upper  right  triangle)  and 





Interest  differentials  Inflation  differentials 
1  2  Cumulated  1  2  CiiKKilaiCd 
--_ 
8.34  3.99  14.03  8.37 
0.54  0.26  0.80  0.56  0.34  0.90 
(A)  Belgium  is benchmark  countryb 
BE  FR  IR  IT 
:  -  0.11  0.11  0.00  0.78  0.50  0.08 
1+2  0.22  0.78  0.58 
(B)  France  is benchmark  country 
BE  FR  IR  IT 
1  0.04  0.32 
2  0.24  -  0.87  0.00 
1+2  0.88  -  0.91  0.32 
(C)  Ireland  is benchmark  country 
BE  FR  IR  IT 
1  0.89  0.76  -  0.24 
2  0.04  0.01  -  0.48 
1+2  0.93  0.77  -  0.92 
(D)  Italy  is benchmark  country 
BE  FR  IR  IT 
1  0.81  0.49  0.19  - 
2  0.11  0.00  0.01  - 
l-l-2  0.92  0.49  0.20  - 
(E)  Netherlands  is benchmark  courltry 
BE  FR  IR  IT 
:  OS  0.03  0.76  0.00  0.9s  0.00  0.82  0.00 
1+2  0.58  0.76  0.95  0.82 
(F)  U.K.  is benchmark  country 
BE  FR  IR  IT 
:  0.07  0.92  0.89  0.06  0.43  0.53  0.29  0.63 
1+2  0.99  0.95  0.96  0.92 
!G)  West  Germany  is benchmark  country 
BE  FR  IR  IT 
1  0.04  0.83  0.96  0. 
2  0.47  0.01  0.01  0.00 



















UK  WC 
0.75  0.33 
0.00  0.22 
0.75  0.55 
UK  WG 
0.81  0.59 
0.02  0.03 
0.83  0.62 
UK  WG 
0.52  0.10 
0.37  0.86 
0.89  0.96 
UK  WG 
0.96  0.76 
0.02  0.01 
0.98  0.77 
UK  WG 
0.19  0.30 
0.02  0.19 





UK  WG 
-  0.40 
-  0.10 
-  0.50 
NL  UK  WG 
0.3 1  0.20  - 
0.03  0.76  - 
0.34  0.96  - 
‘Percentage  of total  variance  and  inflation  differentials  respectively,  explained 
by  first  two  components,  partial  and  cumulated. 
bEnries  in  art  A  to  G  of  this  table  show  the  squared  correlation  of 
th  each  of  the  interest  differentials  (upper  right  triangle)  and 
rentials  (lower  left triangle)  respectively,  and  the  cumulated  fit  of 
the  first  two  ccmponents  (I  + 2). ool,  Bnteresf  and  i 
enomenon. 
e  now  turn  to  the  partitioning  of inflation  differentials  into  a  number  of 
orthogonal  components.  The  first  component,  which  accounts  for  56.2%  of 
all  variation,  captures  the  inflation  differentials  of  France,  Ireland  and  Italy 
versus  Belgium,  the  Netherlands  and  Germany.‘”  The  identification  of  the 
second  principal  component  which  accounts  for  34.5%  of  all  variation  as  a 
United  Kingdom  phenomenon  is suggested  by  the  large  correlations  between 
the  second  principal  component  and  all  inflation  differentials  relative  to  the 
United  Kingdom  (lower  left  triangle,  part  F,  row  2,  and  part  G,  column 
headed  UK,  row  2).14 
4.2.  March  1983 to September  1989 
In  table  2  we  report  the  results  of  the  principal  components  analysis  for 
the  sub  period  from  March  1983 to  September  1989. The  layout  is similar  to 
that  of table  1. 
The  first  component  in  table  2  which  captures  65.0%  of  all  variation, 
reflects  the  interest  differentials  of  the  United  Kingdom,  the  Netherlands  and 
Germany  with  Belgium,  France,  and  Italy.  The  second  component  is an  Irish 
phenomenon  again,  as  can  be  seen  from  the  high  correlations  of  the  second 
principal  component  with  the  Irish  differentials  (see  upper  right  triangle,  part 
C, row  2, and  column  headed  IR,  row  2). The  only  maverick  observation  in 
this  classification  is  the  British-Irish  differential,  which  is  highly  correlated 
with  the  first  instead  of the  second  principal  component. 
The  inflation  results  in  table  2  are  most  unambiguous:  84.9%  of  all 
variation;  in  inflation  differentials  after  March  1983  is  taken  care  of  by  the 
first  component,  reflectI.,,  ‘-0  th.e behavior  of inflation  in  the  United  Kingdom  - 
and  to  a  lesser  extent  Germany  and  the  Netherlands  -  versus  the  other 
countries.  The  second  pr incipal  component  is only  marginally  significant  and 
represents  a mixture  of effects  that  are  hard  to  identify. 
4.3.  Discussion  of the results 
The  above  results  for  interest  rate  behavior  over  the  whole  sample  - 
13The high  correlation  of  the  Irish-French  differential  with  the  first  component  does  not  fit 
into  this division. 
“Additiona!ly.  this  second  component  takes  account  of  the  difference  of  Germany  and  the 
Netherlands  versus  Belgium. 936  K.G.  Knedijk  and  C.J.M.  Kook  Interest  and  inflation  diflerenriais  within  the  EMS 
Table  2 
Principal  components  of  interest  differentials  (upper  right  triangle)  and 
inflation  differentials  (lower  left  triangle)  in  the  E  S: March  1979-September 
1989. 
Component 
Interest  differentials  Inflation  differentials 
1  2  Cumulated  i  2  Cumulated 
Variance  7.84  2.744  8.43  0.56 
Fit”  0.65  0.23  0.88  0.05  0.06  0.91 
_____  ___- 
(A)  Belgium  is benchmark  countryb 
BE  FR  IR  IT 
1  -  0.02  0.08  0.59 
2  -  0.13  0.81  0.03 
1+2  -  0.15  0.89  0.62 
(B)  France  is benchmark  country 
BE  FR  IR  IT 
:  0.06  0.04  -  -  0.04  0.92  0.51  0.08 
1+2  0.10  -  0.96  0.51 
(C)  Ireland  is benchmark  country 
BE  FR  IR  IT 
I  0.43  0.27  -  0.08 
2  0.21  0.10  -  0.83 
I+2  0.64  0.37  -  0.91 
(D)  Italy  is benchmark  country 
BE  FR  IR  I-I 
I  0.61  0.39  0.05  - 
2  0.11  0.19  0.65  - 
1+2  0.72  0.58  0.70  - 
(E)  Netheria.,ds  is benchmark  country 
BE  FR  IR  IT 
I  0.62  0.65  0.82  0.80 
2  0.16  0.08  0.01  0.19 
1+2  0.78  0.73  0.83  0.99 
(F)  U.K.  is benchmark  country 
BE  FR  IR  J’T 
1  0.97  0.95  0.96  0.97 
2  0.00  0.01  0.03  (II.01 
1+2  0.97  0.96  0.99  Ct.98 
(G)  West  Germany  is benchmark  country 
BE  FR  IR  IiT 
1  0.86  0.84  0.  IO.95 
2  0.00  0.01  0.05  IO.02 









UK  WG 
0.83  0.73 
0.04  0.00 
0.87  0.73 
UK  WG 
6.78  0.81 
0.10  0.03 
0.88  0.84 
NL  UK  WC 
0.62  0.79  0.49 
0*35  0.16  0.50 
0.97  0.95  0.99 
NL  UK  WG 
0.86  0.94  0.90 
0.04  0.05  0.00 




UK  WG 
0.38  0.06 
6.03  0.32 
0.41  0.38 
NL  UK  WG 
0.73  0.46 
0.13  0.15 





UK  WG 
0.74  - 
0.00  - 
0.74  - 
_~___.__~_ 
“See table  1 for  notation. 6.  Koedijk  and  C.J. 
the  other,  and  to  the  independent  behavior  of the  Irish  interest  rate. 
Additional  relevant  evidence  is  provided  by  the  last  row  of  each  part  of 
tab!e  1 where  the  cumulative  explanatory  power  of  the  first  two  principal 
components  for  each  bilateral  interest  or  inflation  differential  is  shown.  The 
first  two  principal  components  explain  80% of  the  total  variance  of  the  set of 
bilateral  interest  differentials.  For  individual  interest  differentials  the  amount 
of  explained  variation  may  be  significantly  higher  or  lower,  giving  infor- 
mation  about  the  (dis)similarity  of interest  rate  behavior  across  countries. 
Only  22%  of  the  French-Belgian  interest  rate  differential  in  table  1, for 
example,  is explained  by  the  first  two  principal  components.  Thus,  almost  all 
of  the  variation  between  the  interest  rates  in  these  two  countries  belongs  to 
the  least  important  20%  of  variation  in  the  who!?  system.  This  suggests  a 
close  similarity  between  France  and  Belgium.  In  the  same  way,  the  close 
links  between  the  United  Kingdom,  Germany  and  the  Netherlands  may  be 
illustrated  (cumulative  explanatory  power  for  UK/NL  21x,  UK/WG  500/, 
and  WG/NL  49%). 
The  inflation  results  are  similar,  though  not  identical  to  those  for  interest 
rate  differentials.  The  partitioning  is  somewhat  different.  The  first  principa! 
component  in  the  interest  rate  analysis,  for  example,  is  very  close  to  the 
second  principal  component  in  the  inflation  analysis.  This  similarity  is 
confirmed  by  a  highly  significant  correlation  coefficient  of 0.85  between  these 
two  principal  components.  Both  reflect  the  difference  between  primarily  the 
United  Kingdom  on  the  one  hand  and  the  European  countries,  Belgium, 
France  and  Italy,  on  the  other. 
Movements  in  the  Dutch-Gerzran  inflation  differential  are  even  less 
important  than  those  in  the  Dutch-German  interest  differential:  the  first  two 
principal  components  with  a cumulative  average  explanatory  power  of about 
90% only  explain  34% of  the  variation  between  Dutch  and  German  inflation 
rates. 
The  above  characterization  needs  some  modification  after  March  1983. 
First,  there  appears  to  be  a  shift  in  the  partitioning  of  the  inflation 
differentials:  Belgium  moves  more  to  the  French/Italian  bloc  in  the  second 
half  of  the  sample,  while  the  United  Kingdom  moves  in  the  direction  of 
Germany  and  the  Netherlands.  No  apparent  shifts  take  place  in  the  interest 
analysis.  As  a  consequence,  the  first  principal  components  in  both  the 
interest  rate  and  inflation  analysis  become  very  similar  -  exemplified  by 
a  high  correlation  coefficient  of  0.93  -  reflecting  the  behavior  of  the 
Netherlands,  Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom  versus  the  other  countries. 
Overall,  we  conclude  that  the  hypothesis  that  the  E 938  K.G.  Koedijk  and C.9.  #ool,  Ittterest  and tnjlation  di&rentials  within  the E 
er  countries.” 
possible  source  of  the  served  independent  interest  an 
movements  between  countries  ay  be  the  differences  in  timing 
mentation  of  deflationary  policies  within  the  E  oreover,  this  may  help 
explain  th;  fact  that  the  United  Kingdom,  whi  eory  should  have  been 
able  to  have  the  most  independent  monetary  policy,  in  practice  has 
experienced  inflation  and  interest  movements  closer  to  Germany  than  EMS 
countries  like  France  and  Italy  after  1983. 
In  this  respect,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  total  variation  in  inflation 
differentials  is considerably  lower  for  the  period  after  1983 than  for  the  whole 
period,  while  the  total  variation  in  nominal  interest  rate  differentials  remains 
about  constant.  Unreported  results  for  real  interest  -  measured  as  nominal 
in+@rpst  minus  inflation  -  .  &.VLI  c a  differentials  and  money  growth  differentials  support 
our  hypothesis.  l6  The  variation  in  real  interest  differentials  significantly 
declines  after  1983, corresponding  to  the  decline  in  the  variation  in  inflation 
differentials,  suggesting  it had  a primarily  monetary  origin. 
Additional  evidence  on  interest  and  inflation  differentials  of  France,  Italy 
and  the  United  Kingdom  versus  Germany  to  support  this  hypothesis  is 
provided  in  figs.  1  and  2.  From  these  figures,  it  is  clear  that  the  United 
Kingdom  was: a  high  inflation  -  high  interest  country  in  the  early  eighties, 
looking  more  like  France  and  Italy,  than  like  Germany  (or  the  Netherlands). 
The  timing  of  peaks  and  troughs  in  inflation  and  interest  rates  were  quite 
different,  though,  in  these  three  high  inflation  countries.  The  United 
Kingdom  experiences  a  sharp  peak  in  1980 and  rapid  decline  thereafter.  The 
peaks  in  France  and  Italy  arrive  later,  in  1981,  persist  longer  and  only 
gradually  decline. 
In  terms  of  dominant  movements  in  interest  and  inflation  differentials,  the 
figures  suggest  that  the  major  part  of interest  and  inflation  movements  of the 
United  Kingdom  versus  Germany  occurred  before  March  1983. From  that 
time  onward,  these  differentials  fluctuated  around  more  or  less  stationary 
means  of  6%  and  4%,  respectively,  signalling  persistent  but  approximately 
constant  differences  in  interest  and  inflation  levels  between  the  United 
ingdom  and  Germany. 
ISThese  findings  are  also  consistent  with  Germany  acting  as  a  Stackelberg-leader,  taking 
into  accorlnt  policy  actions  of  other  EMS  countries,  specifically  France,  Belgium  and  the 
Netherlands.  As  the  principal  components  analysis  lacks  a  temporal  dimension,  however, 
determination  of the  direction  of causality  and  discrimination  between  alternative  hypotheses  is 
infeasible. 
16Tbe principal  components  results  for  real  interest  and  money  growth  differentials  may  be 
obtained  from  the authors  on  request. France 
1919  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Fig.  1. Interest  rate  differential  relative  to  Germany. 
For  Italy  and  France  a  different  picture  emerges.  Starting  with  high 
interest  and  inflation  relative  to  Germany  in  the  early  eighties,  the  decline  in 
interest  and  inflation  differentials  strongly  continues  after  1983.  For  both 
countries  and  both  variables  a  pronounced  negative  trend  is visible  in  figs.  1 
and  2, which  is picked  up  by  the  principal  components  analysis. 
This  exemplifies  the  difference  between  a floating  and  a fixed exchange  rate 
regime  and  supports  De  Grauwe’s  (1990)  claim  that  membership  of  a  fixed 
exchange  rate  arrangement  limits  the  speeds  of  deflationary  policies:  the 
United  Kingdom  managed  a  rapid  deflation  after  1980  due  to  its  floating 
exchange  rate  at  the  cost  of  a  large  economic  down-turn,  while  it  took 
France  and  Italy  until  1985  to  bring  their  inflation  down  to  similar  levels. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  United  Kingdom  facing  no  long-run  exchange  rate 
constraint  was  either  unable  or  unwilling  to  reduce  the  remaining  inflation 
and  interest  differential  with  Germany  after  1983.  y  1989,  the  gradual 
approach  followed  by  France  and  Italy  -  forced  by  the  long-run 
rate  constraint  -  has  resulted  in  inflation  and  interest  rates  closer  to 
levels than  is the  case  for  the  United  Kingdom. 
Stated  alternatively,  cvun;iies  within  a  fixed  exchange  rate  system  may 
borrow  anti-inflation  credibility  from  the  leading  country,  as  ar 
Giavazzi  a  paventa  (1989).  Thus,  the  lo  olitical  credibi~i 
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Fig. 2. Inflation  differential  relative  to Germany. 
Italy 
fixed  exchange  rate  regime  of  the  EMS  may  have  facilitated  the  slow 
convergence  observed  in  France  and  Italy.  This  way,  these  countries  have 
been  able  to  avoid  (part  of)  the  costs  of  a  large  recession.  Since  October 
1990, the  United  Kingdom  also  has  etiectively  opted  for  using  the  exchange 
rate  constraint  to  borrow  credibility  and  :n  z~dual!y  reduce  i3flatinz  acd 
interest  rates  to  German  levels  and  has  entered  the  exchange  rate  mechanism 
(ERM)  of the  EMS. 
Recently,  the  issue  has  risen  hnw  the  final  transition  to  EMU  should  take 
place.  While  the  Delors-report  argues  in  favor  of  gradual  total  convergence 
to  a  situation  of  permenently  fixed  exchange  rates,  Giovannini  (1991)  and 
Dornbusch  11991) favor  a  discontinuous  jump  in  the  near  future,  particularly 
for  those  ctirrencies  which  do  not  exhibit  trend  depreciation  versus  the 
German  mark  any  more. 
Several  argiaments  are  presented  for  this  iatter  position:  first,  the  smaller 
the  inflstion  differential  with  Germany,  the  harder  to  reduce  it  further.  In 
e  Aaly,  for  example,  inflation  has  converged  considerably  more 
nally  high  real  interest  rates.  Second, 
ffere~t~a~s and  a  growing  unwillingness  to  initiate 
t  convergence  will  be to  distinguish  real  and 
Our  results  suggest  that  even  the  long-run  exchange  rate  constraint 
generated  by  the  EMS allows  much  la  ude  in  the  movements  of  inflation 
and  interest  differentials, both  through  fferences  in  institutions  and  in  the 
timing  and  implementation  of  monetary  -  ationary  -  policies  across 
countries.  Given  the  very  different  positions  of  the  various  EMS  countries, 
ranging  from  the  Netherlands  which  already  almost  forms  an  implicit 
monetary  union  with Germany,  to Spain and  the United  Kingdom  with high 
inflation  and  interest  rates  -  not  to  mention  countries  like  Greece  and 
Portugal  which  do  not  even  participate  in  the  ERM  as  yet  -  our  results 
provide additional  evidence in favor  of a discrete jump  to permanently  fixed 
exchange rates in the not too distant  future. 
5. Conclusions 
In  this  paper  we  have  applied  a  modified  version  of  the  principal 
components  analysis to investigate  nominal interest  and  inflation differentials 
within  the  EMS,  including  the  United  Kingdom.  All  countries  have  been 
treated  symmetrically,  removing  the  need  to  a  priori  choose  a  benchmark 
country.  Monthly  data  for  the  period  March  1979-September  1989 have 
been  used.  The  sub-period  March  1983-September  1989  has  also  been 
considered separately. 
We  conclude  that  the  most  important  differences  within  the  EMS  are 
between  Germany,  the  Netherlands  and  the  United  Kingdom  on  the  one 
hand,  and  Belgium,  France  and  Italy  on  the  other.  In  the  interest  rate 
analysis,  Ireland  takes  a  separate  position  accounting  for  the  second  most 
important  component. 
Neither  for  the  whole  period,  nor  for  the  period  after  March  1983 the 
EMS  has  functioned  as  a  Dmark-zone.  Although  the  Netherlands  and 
Germany  almost  form  one  currency-area,  large  differences in  independent 
interest  and  inflation  differentials  wth  other  countries  have  persisted.  This 
supports  earlier  work  by  De  Grauwe  (1989),  Fratianni  and  von  Hagen 
(1990a, b) and von Hagen and  Fratianni  (1990). 
Deflationary  policies  have  been  implemented  sooner  and  faster  in  the 
United  Kingdom  than  in,  for  example,  France  and  Italy.  These  latter  two 
couuiries  have  only  gradually  deflated  leading  to  stabilized  and  lower 
inflation  after  1986 only.  e  Grauwe  (1990) argues  that  membership  of a 
fixed exchange rate arrangement  limits the speed of  eflationaiy  policies. 
the  other  hand,  France  and  Italy  may  have  been  a 942  K.G.  Koedijk  and C.J.  Kool,  Interest  and inflation digereatials  within  the  EMS 
ve  consequences  of  their  olicies  due  to  t 
in  the  early  eighties 
regime is theoretically  able to  independently  gain anti-inflationary  credibility 
based on its own policy actions  and  at  large internal  costs. The stabilization 
of interest  and  inflation  rate  high  above  German  levels after  1983 and  the 
occurrences  in  the  last  few  years  have  shown,  however,  that  it  may  be 
difficult to maintain  such credibility. 
With  respect  to  the  issue of  how  to  proceed  to  EMU,  our  results  show 
that  inflation  and  interest  differentials may  exhibit  considerable  independent 
movements,  despite  the  exchange  rate  constraint.  We  interpret  this  as 
evidence in favor  of a discrete jump  to  permanently  fixed exchange  rates  in 
the near future for at least part  of the current  EMS countries. 
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